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PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION: LAW AND PROCEDURE
Paul R. Baier*
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
United Parcel Service has come a long way since James Casey
founded the business in Seattle, Washington, in 1907. What used to
be a group of young boys delivering packages on foot and by bicycle
has grown into a big business, operating in thirty-five states, and
after Transway, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission' one
can expect to see more U.P.S. vehicles running parcels intrastate2 in
Louisiana under certification from the Public Service Commission.
Transway, a competitor of United, challenged issuance by the Com-
mission of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to United
on the ground that certification created a class of common carrier not
recognized by law-that is, a carrier of general commodities over
irregular routes. R.S. 45:162(4) prescribes in part "[tihere shall be
two main classes of common carriers, 'common carriers of commodi-
ties over regular routes' . . . and 'common carriers of special commodi-
ties over irregular routes'." (Emphasis added.) Although no special
items were listed in the certificate issued to United, the Louisiana
supreme court affirmed the Commission's issuance of the certificate
because United was limited to delivering commodities under a cer-
tain size and weight and because United was required to furnish
special service and handling. The court relied on the statutory defi-
nition of "special commodities" as those "which require special
equipment, service or handling over irregular routes,"3 and the court
held that United's operation fulfilled these requirements. The court
was particularly impressed by the fact that the Public Service Com-
mission thought it best in regulating the motor carrier industry to
emphasize the peculiarity of the type of service, equipment, and han-
dling required rather than the commodity itself. "This attitude of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 296 So. 2d 305 (La. 1974).
2. United was operating interstate in Louisiana under appropriate regulations at
the time it applied for intrastate certification from Louisiana's Public Service Commis-
sion. See 296 So. 2d at 306. Under LA. R.S. 45:194 (Supp. 1960) (a part of the Motor
Carriers' Regulatory Act) it is unlawful for any motor carrier operating interstate in
Louisiana to operate over public highways in this state without first having filed a
certified copy of its Interstate Commerce Commission authority with the Louisiana
Public Service Commission. There is one other provision of the act which deals with
registration and supervision of interstate carriers, LA. R.S. 45:163.1 (Supp. 1972).
3. LA. R.S. 45:162(4) (1950).
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Commission acquired through its experience and expertise, and no
doubt influenced by the practices in motor transport, impresses us as
being entirely consistent with the spirit of the law and its objec-
tive-to render reliable service in response to the shipping needs of
the public." 4 Moreover, it made no difference to the court that the
Public Service Commission has apparently changed its view regard-
ing the meaning of special commodities carriers; nothing in the law
prevented the agency charged with administering Louisiana's Motor
Carriers' Regulatory Act' from changing its mind about the meaning
of statutory terms where the ultimate effect is to implement the
policies underpinning the Act.'
Three Public Service Commission cases this term involve impor-
tant procedural issues. The first case, United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.
Louisiana Public Service Commission,7 concerns the question
whether the Commission-may charge against a utility the cost of
hiring a Washington, D.C. attorney as special counsel to the Commis-
4. 296 So. 2d at 309.
5. LA. R.S. 45:161-97 (1950), as amended.
6. 296 So. 2d at 308. In reviewing the Commission's construction and application
of the Motor Carriers' Regulatory Act, the court was guided by the policy expressions
contained in the act: "Regulation of traffic by motor carriers is authorized by the
legislature, among other reasons, 'so the public will be given the benefit of the most
economic and efficient means of transportation.' This policy is carried out by the
certificate awarded to United, under which it will furnish a service no other carrier has
offered to undertake-a service the need for which is amply demonstrated by the
record." Id. at 309.
The point that administrative agencies are not bound to follow their own prior
administrative determinations was also made this term by the First Circuit Court of
Appeal in Kidd v. Board of Trustees of Teachers' Retirement System, 294 So. 2d 265
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), a case which involved the question whether members of the
Teachers' Retirement System are entitled to credit under the Teachers' Retirement
Act for pre-membership, part-time service rendered while enrolled as a student in
educational institutions or performed for certain state agencies. See LA. R.S.
17:571(22), (23) (1950), as amended. The Board of Trustees of the Teachers' Retire-
ment System had on several occasions allowed credit for part-time student work, but
it finally settled on an interpretation disallowing credit. The First Circuit held that
the Board was entitled to change its mind on the matter because "'[the doctrine of
stare decisis . . . is not generally applicable to the decisions of administrative tribu-
nals; nor does a prior administrative determination ordinarily preclude a subsequent
one on the grounds of equitable estoppel. Accordingly, administrative bodies are not
ordinarily bound by their prior determinations or the principles or policies on which
they are based. However, prior determinations are entitled to great weight . . . and
radical departures from administrative interpretation consistently followed cannot be
made except for most cogent reasons.'" 294 So. 2d at 271, quoting 73 C.J.S. Public
Administrative Bodies and Procedure § 148 (1951).
7. 279 So. 2d 195 (La. 1973).
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sion in an investigation of the utility. A majority of our supreme court
answered no, notwithstanding the prevailing practice in this country
of allowing regulatory agencies like the Public Service Commission
to charge to the regulated utility company the expenses incurred in
conducting an examination of the affairs of the utility for the purpose
of fixing and regulating the rates charged or the services rendered by
the utility under investigation. The right to recover these investiga-
tory expenses is limited by statute in Louisiana,8 and the majority
held that no provision of existing law permits a recovery of special
counsel fees? The special services were those normally performed by
a lawyer and they could have been performed by the Commission's
regular counsel. 0 Although the court found merit in the Commis-
sion's argument that, unless allowed a recovery, the Commission
would be unable to hire adequate and experienced counsel and it
would be at a disadvantage in dealing with regulated utilities, the
majority remitted the Commission to the state legislature, where the
authority exists to amend the law to provide for the Commission's
charging the regulated utilities with the expense of employing special
counsel. Justice Summers in his concurring opinion emphasized the
general rule in Louisiana disallowing recovery of attorney's fees in the
absence of a contract or statute specifically authorizing a recovery."
The three dissenting justices would have allowed the Public Service
8. See LA. R.S. 45:1180 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1954, No. 376 § 1. This
statute provides essentially that "all expenses incurred by the commission in conduct-
ing such examination, including the expenses and fees of engineers, consultants, ac-
countants or clerical assistants specially employed to make the examination, shall...
be paid by the person so examined." LA. R.S. 45:1181 (1950) says that only such
engineers, consultants, accountants or clerical assistants as are actually necessary to
conduct the examination shall be employed and their compensation shall be fixed
according to the time actually devoted to the work of conducting the examination and
making their reports thereon whether as witness before the Commission in open hear-
ing or by written report, under oath, as required by law.
9. The court acknowledged that under LA. R.S. 45:1177 (1950), as amended, the
commission is authorized to hire its own regular, full-time attorney and that this
attorney is to be paid out of fees collected from the regulated companies. But there is
a difference, said the majority, between the Commission's power to appoint its own
regular attorney and the power to appoint special counsel and then to charge this
special counsel's fees against the regulated companies. The latter is not embraced in
section 1177, nor is the power to appoint special counsel elsewhere given the Commis-
sion by statue.
10. The Commission is authorized to hire its own regular counsel. See note 9
supra.
11. 279 So. 2d at 199 (Summers, J., concurring). See also Fleming v. Louisiana
Dept. of Education, 293 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
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Commission to assess against the regulated utility the expenses in-
curred in hiring special counsel. 2
Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service
Commission'3 is the second procedural case. It concerns the scope of
the constitutionally protected right in Louisiana to judicial review of
Commission orders;'4 and the effect of the Red Ball case is to restrict
judicial review to review of the record of evidence presented in the
first instance before the Public Service Commission. Thus it is error
for a trial judge on judicial review of an order of the Commission to
consider evidence different from that offered at the hearing before the
Commission. This result follows from R.S. 45:1194, which provides
for the suspension of judicial proceedings upon presentation of new
facts on review and requires that any new evidence be sent back to
the Commission before rendition of any judgment by the trial court.
This statute limits the scope of judicial review to evidence which the
Commission has had an opportunity to consider; the language of the
statute is mandatory and the trial judge has no discretion in the
matter. 5 But the court made it clear that an aggrieved party has the
right in a proper case to introduce evidence which is different from
or additional to that offered before the Commission so long as the
Commission is first given the opportunity to consider the evidence.
The court also stated that the presumption of correctness of adminis-
trative action does not prohibit the introduction of evidence in sup-
port of a contention that the order is arbitrary, capricious, unreasona-
ble, or that it was issued without any legal evidence to support it.'
The last case, 7 a rate-making case before the Public Service
Commission, holds that the principle of res judicata does not freeze
a rate base for all subsequent rate proceedings of the same public
utility before the Public Service Commission. Citing article 2286 of
12. Justice Marcus, joined by Justice Tate, was of the view that, while attorney's
fees are not ordinarily recoverable in Louisiana except when allowed by contract or
statute, R.S. 45:1180 is such an authorization. 279 So. 2d at 200 (Marcus, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Dixon also dissented in the case, without opinion.
13. 286 So. 2d 337 (La. 1973).
14. The constitution prescribes that "any party in interest may appeal from orders
and decrees of the Commission to the courts by filing suit... against the Commission
at its domicile." La. Const. art. VI, § 5 (1921). It should be noted that, although this
provision of the constitution establishes the right to judicial review of Commission
orders, it is silent regarding the scope of review.
15. 286 So. 2d at 339, citing White v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 259 La. 363,
250 So. 2d 368 (1971).
16. 286 So. 2d at 340.
17. Greater Livingston Water Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 294 So. 2d 501
(La. 1974).
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the Civil Code,"8 the court held that the object of the earlier proceed-
ing involving the same utility was a rate increase; the assumption of
a rate base in the earlier case was only an aid in testing the adequacy
of the rate, and the earlier rate base is not binding on the Commission
in futuro. 1
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS
By far the most significant civil service case decided during the
1973-1974 term is Barnett v. Develle,10 in which the supreme court
declared unconstitutional as violative of Louisiana's Civil Service
Amendment' an attempt on the part of the state legislature to fix the
salaries and annual vacation time of firemen in cities of 12,000 or
more population, including New Orleans, a city which has a city civil
service commission.22 The patent purpose of Article XIV, §15 of the
Louisiana constitution of 1921 (the Civil Service Amendment) is to
insure uniform treatment of all similarly classified employees in the
state and municipal civil service systems, to avoid discrimination and
favoritism, to promote efficiency of governmental operation, and to
encourage promotion based on merit. The court decided that "the
electorate, by adoption of Section 15, has placed certain aspects of
State and municipal classified employment beyond the pale of state
and local governmental control," 3 including the rates of pay of classi-
fied employees such as firemen. Any other interpretation would
emasculate the operation of the civil service system in Louisiana," or
as the court put it: "It would also completely negate the expressly
conferred authority of the Commission to establish and adopt rules
and plans fixing the pay and hours of employment of City Civil Ser-
18. "The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with respect to what
was the object of the judgment .. "
19. The First Circuit Court of Appeal also held this term that administrative
agencies are not bound by the judicial doctrine of res judicata in Kidd v. Board of
Trustees of Teachers' Retirement System, 294 So. 2d 265 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974). See
also note 6 supra.
20. 289 So. 2d 129 (La. 1974).
21. La. Const. art. XIV, § 15 (1921), as amended.
22. See LA. R.S. 33:1992 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, Ex. Sess., No. 55,
§ 1; LA. R.S. 33:1996 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, Ex. Sess., No. 57, § 1.
23. 289 So. 2d at 143.
24. This was Professor Dakin's conclusion too, in an earlier symposium issue,
when he commented on Louisiana Civil Serv. League v. Forbes, 258 La. 390, 246 So.
2d 800 (1971). See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term
- Administrative Regulation: Law and Procedure, 32 LA. L. Rav. 271, 280 (1972). The
Forbes case held the legislature had no power to increase the pay scales of state police
officers, because these employees are under the state civil service.
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vice Employees."25 The opinion in Barnett is well-reasoned and thor-
ough, and it seems to this writer that the court reached the only
principled conclusion possible in the case.
But aside from the merits, the opinion in Barnett v. Develle is
important because it straightens up the jurisprudence; what looked
like a conflict in the cases has been resolved. One line suggested that
the legislature could indeed favor city firemen by raising their pay
through special acts, notwithstanding the fact that firemen are classi-
fied municipal civil service employees." At the same time, the su-
preme court in Louisiana Civil Service League v. Forbes" denied the
legislature the power to increase the pay scale of state police officers
because these employees are under the state civil service. But what
is good for the state civil service system would also seem to be good
for the municipal systems, and so the court has now applied Forbes'
reasoning to city civil service commissions as well. To that end the
court in Barnett expressly overruled earlier and inconsistent juris-
prudence."2
Either an appointing authority or an employee in classified civil
service subject to the jurisdiction of municipal fire and police civil
service boards may appeal an adverse decision to a district court, and
the hearing on review "shall be confined to the determination of
whether the decision made by the board was made in good faith for
cause." 9 Based on this language, our supreme court in Milam v.
Municipal Fire & Police Civil Service Board'" held it was necessary
to allege in the notice of appeal to the district court that the action
of the board was not made in good faith for cause; otherwise the
notice of appeal was fatally defective, resulting in dismissal of the
appeal. One court of appeal went so far in enforcing Milam's strict
pleading requirement as to order dismissal of an appeal where the
25. 289 So. 2d at 146.
26. See Firefighters Local 632 v. City of New Orleans, 204 So. 2d 690 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1967) (Firefighters I); Firefighters Local 632 v. City of New Orleans, 230 So.
2d 326 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 232 So. 2d 78 (La. 1970) (Firefighters I);
Firefighters Local 632 v. City of New Orleans, 269 So. 2d 194 (La. 1972) (Firefighters
III).
27. 258 La. 390, 246 So. 2d 800 (1971).
28. Barnett v. Develle, 289 So. 2d 129, 144 (La. 1974), overruling Firefighters I,
II, and III. The supreme court in the Barnett case applied its ruling of unconstitu-
tionality prospectively only-that is, the firemen who had received benefits under the
special acts of the legislature were allowed to keep them to the date of the court's
decision in Barnett.
29. La. Const. art. XIV, § 15.1 (1921). The right to judicial review in such cases
is also found in LA. R.S. 33:2501 (1950); LA. R.S. 33:2561 (Supp. 1964).
30. 253 La. 218, 217 So. 2d 377 (1968).
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appointing authority alleged in the notice of appeal that its own
action was in good faith for cause but forgot to aver the contrary
about the civil service board's action.3 ' To dismiss in such a case
would seem to exalt form over substance and to violate the rule that
appeals are favored in the law.2 Moreover, as Professor Dakin has
pointed out in earlier symposium work on administrative regula-
tion,33 our supreme court seems to have relaxed the requirements of
agency appeals-pleading; and this term in Odum v. City of Minden"'
the Louisiana supreme court continued to mitigate the notice-of-
appeal requirements. The court, expressly overruling the Milam case,
held that the words "not in good faith for cause" are unnecessary for
a valid notice of appeal to the district court. This language, said the
court, refers to the scope of judicial review and not to the content of
the notice of appeal. To hold otherwise would impose more technical-
ity in administrative proceedings than in ordinary actions, and the
court found no adequate basis for such a stringent requirement. "It
suffices if the notice of appeal contains a reasonably clear and concise
statement of the action from which the appeal is taken."3The integrity of agency process in civil service discharge cases
was before the First Circuit Court of Appeal in Newbrough v. State
Department of Highways,3 a case which reveals especially irresponsi-
ble agency practice. 7 Newbrough was classified as an Engineering
Aide III with the Department of Highways. He was required to sub-
mit to a physical examination given by the Department's physician
on October 5, 1970, and he was subsequently advised of his termina-
31. Odum v. City of Minden, 263 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972), rev'd, 281
So. 2d 117 (La. 1973). The Second Circuit's opinion in the Odum case is commented
on in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-
Administrative Regulation: Law and Procedure, 34 LA. L. REV. 301 (1974).
32. In Smith v. Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans, 262 La. 96, 262
So. 2d 383 (1972), the supreme court held that the rule that appeals are favored in law
also applies to civil service matters.
33. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972
Term-Administrative Regulation: Law and Procedure, 33 LA. L. REv. 259, 263 (1973):
"It seems a fair inference that. . . in agency pleading we may be moving toward the
notice pleading of the Federal Rules."
34. 281 So. 2d 117 (La. 1973).
35. Id. at 119.
36. 280 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973). The Newbrough case was before the
First Circuit once before on a question of agency appeals-pleading. See Newbrough v.
State Dep't of Highways, 257 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), noted in The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Administrative Regula-
tion: Law and Procedure, 33 LA. L. REv. 259, 263 (1973).
37. The characterization is the court's. See 280 So. 2d at 649 (the Department's
action is "doubly irresponsible").
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tion for medical reasons on November 2, 1970. However, Newbrough
was not given a copy of the physician's report nor was he told of its
contents at the time of his termination; rather, he had to wait until
the hearing of the civil service commission on his appeal-some
twenty months later-before he discovered the medical reasons
claimed by the Department to justify his discharge. This delay, the
First Circuit held, was fatal and in violation of a civil service rule "
requiring a detailed statement of reasons for a dismissal." Without a
copy of the medical report of the Department's physician, the em-
ployee is in no position to refute the charges against him. Moreover,
the court added that it is almost impossible to refute charges of ill
health twenty months later.
There were other reasons for reversing the civil service commis-
sion's decision upholding Newbrough's termination for cause. An
important substantive restraint on the freedom of an appointing au-
thority to discharge for cause is that "there must be a real and sub-
stantial relation between the conduct of the employee and the effi-
cient operation of the public service; otherwise legal cause is not
present." 0 Applying this restraint to the case of a classified employee
discharged for medical reasons, the First Circuit in Newbrough held
there must be some substantial relation between the medical or phys-
ical disability for which the employee is discharged and the require-
ments or qualifications of his job." Newbrough was terminated be-
cause of high blood pressure and excessive weight; the Department's
physician had reported that Newbrough was not physically qualified
for employment "in all classes." But this medical report was hardly
credible, because the Department had never given any medical stan-
dards or guidelines to its physician to use in evaluating employees,
nor had the Department's physician been given any description of the
tasks performed in the various categories of Highway Department
classified service. The court noted that, while Newbrough's job did
require some physical exertion, the commission did not find that he
was ever unable to perform the required tasks; nor was there any
probative testimony to substantiate the connection between the as-
38. LA. CIv. SERv. COMM'N R. 12.3.
39. The court of appeal, referring to Civil Service Commission Rule 12.3, said:
"We consider 'the detailed reasons' for dismissal sacramental to a termination, without
which a reversal of the dismissal should be in order, for the very obvious reason that
the employee who does not know the basis of his dismissal has no way to refute charges
against him." 280 So. 2d at 649.
40. Id. at 650, quoting Leggett v. Northwestern State College, 242 La. 927, 938,
140 So. 2d 5, 9 (1962).
41. Id.
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signed cause for Newbrough's termination and the duties required of
him as an employee of the Department of Highways. Physical exer-
tion would hardly seem a problem to a man who, according to the
testimony in the case, was known to lift the rear-end of a Volkswagen
for the fun of it. The court ordered Newbrough reinstated to his
former position with reimbursement for all loss of wages and benefits.
SCHOOL BOARDS
The Louisiana supreme court, disagreeing with the Fourth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of Louisiana's Public Meetings Law, has ordered
more sunshine in on the meetings of the Orleans Parish School Board.
Last term the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that "conference
sessions" of the school board were not "meetings" within the meaning
of the Public Meetings Law,42 which requires that all meetings of
public boards "shall be open to the public." 3 These conference ses-
sions were executive and private in nature; they were scheduled in
advance, with notice to participants only (not to the public); there
was an agenda; minutes were taken; and semi-binding determina-
tions, which later required formal board action, were taken by vote
on many matters. But on these criteria the Louisiana supreme court
held there must be compliance with the statute: such meetings are a
type which the statute requires to be open to the public, except when
recessed into executive session in accordance with R.S. 42:6, and it
made no difference to the court that the school board had a rule
authorizing executive sessions to consider matters of administration.
Whatever right the school board had to adopt a rule permitting exec-
utive sessions prior to the enactment of the Public Meetings Law in
1952," this law by its mandatory terms requires "all" meetings of
42. See Reeves v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 264 So. 2d 243 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1972), rev'd, 281 So. 2d 719 (La. 1973). Professor Dakin commented on the Fourth
Circuit's holding in the Reeves case in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1972-1973 Term-Administrative Regulation: Law and Procedure, 34 LA. L.
REV. 301, 307 (1974).
43. LA. R.S. 42:5 (Supp. 1952).
44. Louisiana's "Sunshine Law" (public meetings law) was first enacted by La.
Acts 1952, No. 484. Justice Summers' special concurring opinion in the Reeves case in
the supreme court thoroughly reviews the history and purpose of this legislation. Jus-
tice Summers noted: "In an attempt to require governmental bodies to conduct their
affairs openly, public meeting statutes have been enacted. The passage of open meet-
ing statutes is one of the achievements of a broader campaign, spearheaded primarily
by the American press, to promote freedom of information. The freedom-of-
information campaign is based on the argument that public knowledge of the consider-
ations upon which governmental action is based, as well as knowledge of the final
action taken, is an essential component of the American process." 281 So. 2d at 723
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boards with policymaking or administrative functions to be held only
with adequate notice given to the public as to time and place, and
these meetings must be open to the public, except solely as permitted
by statute" to be recessed for a specified time into executive session. 6
The court did say, however, that the school board was free to have
administrative and informal conferences in private, at which purely
administrative or highly sensitive matters are discussed for the ex-
change of views without a primary purpose of making a binding deter-
mination requiring board action.47 It is clear that the court's opinion
in Reeves v. Orleans Parish School Board will have an impact beyond
school boards, since the court's interpretation will apply generally to
all the public boards and governing bodies specified in R.S. 42:5.
It is well settled school law in Louisiana that a probationary
teacher may not be discharged by a school board except upon the
written recommendation of the superintendent of schools accompa-
nied by valid reasons for the discharge." To effect a proper dismissal
of a probationary teacher, both the superintendent and the school
board must comply literally with the terms of the applicable statute,
which is R.S. 17:442. In Serignet v. Livingston Parish School Board,"
a probationary teacher was notified of his termination by the superin-
tendent of schools in a letter which stated: "The reason for this action
being incompetency and wilful neglect of duty as supported by the
attached copy of resolution of the Livingston Parish School Board."
But the parish school board's resolution recited no facts showing the
teacher was incompetent or that he had wilfully neglected his duty;
all the school board's resolution did was to refer back to the superin-
tendent's recommendation of termination. The First Circuit Court of
Appeal held this termination procedure violated the mandatory re-
quirement of R.S. 17:442 that a recommendation of termination must
be "accompanied by valid reasons therefor." The superintendent's
letter charging incompetence and neglect of duty was insufficient
because the charges in the letter of termination were not detailed
(Summers, J., concurring), citing Comment, 58 IOWA L. REv. 210 (1972). Justice Sum-
mers also pointed out that, for him, public meetings legislation is mainly desirable for
its educational effect, rather than for its effect as a legal weapon. "Compliance should
properly depend not upon rulings of this Court, but upon the good faith of public
officials and upon their respect for the electorate whom they serve." 281 So. 2d at 724.
45. LA. R.S. 42:6 (Supp. 1952).
46. 281 So. 2d at 722.
47. Id. at 721.
48. See LA. R.S. 17:442 (1950); State v. Bienville Parish School Bd., 198 La. 688,
4 So. 2d 649 (1941); State ex rel. Kennington v. Red River Parish School Bd., 193 So.
225 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
49. 282 So. 2d 761 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
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enough; they were "mere conclusions," to use the court's characteri-
zation. The court said: "To support a dismissal the recommendation
must contain a specific recitation of facts sufficient to afford the
dismissed teacher opportunity for rebuttal. 50
The First Circuit's strict interpretation in Serignet of the re-
quirement that "valid reasons" must be stated to effect a proper
discharge seems to confuse probationary discharge procedure with
procedures for the discharge of a tenured teacher-the latter requir-
ing notice, written charges, and a full hearing prior to the discharge."
Certainly incompetence and neglect of duty are valid reasons which
would support a recommendation to terminate. But to go on to the
conclusion that a probationary teacher must be given detailed writ-
ten charges sufficient to afford an opportunity for rebuttal seems to
obliterate the hard line which the law has always drawn between
probationary teachers and those with tenure. 2 Nor do the cases cited
in the opinion support the court's novel reading of R.S. 17:442.53
In Pitcher v. Iberia Parish School Board," a probationary teacher
was discharged for failure to comply with a school board rule requir-
ing all teachers to submit to an annual physical examination by a
physician of their choice. The rule was adopted to assure that the
parish's teachers were medically fit to hold their teaching jobs. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeal sustained the rule against an argument
that the required medical examination violates the constitutional
right of privacy. Not so, said the court. Reasonable interference with
privacy is not forbidden by the law, and ample reason exists for
requiring an annual medical checkup among teachers. Moreover, the
invasion of privacy involved in the case is minimal, said the court.
The teacher is free to pick the examining physician, and the results
50. Id. at 763. The court also said "the School Board must act upon detailed
written charges specified by the Superintendent to effect a proper dismissal." Id.
51. See LA. R.S. 17:443 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 329 § 1. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Fleming v. Concordia Parish School Bd., 275 So. 2d
795 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973), noted in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1972-1973 Term-Administrative Regulation: Law and Procedure, 34 LA. L. REV.
301, 305 (1974), has also confused these two procedures.
52. Compare LA. R.S. 17:442 (1950) with LA. R.S. 17:443 (1950), as amended by
La. Acts 1972, No. 329 § 1. Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (no
substantive due process protection accorded non-tenured college teacher; no constitu-
tional right to a hearing on college's refusal to rehire teacher).
53. Both State v. Bienville Parish School Bd., 198 La. 688, 4 So. 2d 649 (1941)
and State ex rel. Kennington v. Red River Parish School Bd., 193 So. 225 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1939), are distinguishable from the Serignet case because in those cases the
superintendent had not given any written reasons for the discharge.
54. 280 So. 2d 603 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
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of the examination are disclosed to no one except the teacher. Only
the physician's ultimate conclusion regarding the medical fitness of
the teacher to continue employment is reported to the school board.
In these narrow circumstances the court held there is no violation of
the right of privacy. Failure to comply with the rule is a valid reason
for discharge within the meaning of R.S. 17:442.
In affirming the discharge in the Pitcher case, the court of appeal
noted that the scope of judicial review of the actions of a school board
is limited: a presumption of validity attaches to the discretionary
actions of the board, and it is not within the power of the court to
substitute its views for those of a school board when there is a rational
basis for the board's policy determinations. 5
That judicial review of school board decisions is limited also
proved dispositive in two other teacher discharge cases decided dur-
ing the term. In Celestine v. Lafayette Parish School Board," a
teacher was terminated for incompetency in administering what the
school board considered the wrong punishment for an incident involv-
ing student obscenity. The teacher was discharged because of his poor
judgment in requiring an eleven-year-old girl to write a vulgar, four-
letter word (beginning with the letter F) 1,000 times in the presence
of the other members of the class. Judge Hood for the Third Circuit
refused to speculate regarding the effect of such a punishment on the
child involved or on the other pupils in the class. It was enough that
the school board thought the teacher's action manifested extremely
poor judgment." That the court in the Celestine case deferred to the
views of the school board seems understandable, despite the fact that
some individuals might argue that the punishment administered by
the teacher in the case well fit the crime. Still, where there are two
views, it is probably best to leave arguments about the appropriate-
ness of different forms of student discipline to the school officials
themselves and not to the judges. At least that would seem to be the
result required by the rationale, stated by the Louisiana supreme
court in State ex rel Rathe v. Jefferson Parish School Board," of
55. Id. at 608, citing Moffett v. Calcasieu Parish School Bd., 179 So. 2d 537 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1965) and Blanchet v. Vermilion Parish School Bd., 220 So. 2d 534 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1969).
56. 284 So. 2d 650 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
57. The court quoted from State ex rel. Rathe v. Jefferson Parish School Bd., 206
La. 317, 360, 19 So. 2d 153, 167 (1943): "There is nothing more firmly established in
law than the principle that, within the limits of their authority, the power and discre-
tion of legally created governing boards is supreme. Their wisdom or good judgment
cannot be questioned by the courts." 284 So. 2d at 653.
58. 206 La. 317, 19 So. 2d 153 (1943).
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limited judicial review of the policy determinations of school boards.
Moreover, the Third Circuit in the Celestine case rejected the argu-
ment that the teacher's right to academic freedom entitled him to
administer the punishment at issue in the case. 5
The other case applying the basic premise of school law that
courts will not interfere with a school board's bona fide exercise of
discretion is Simon v. Jefferson Davis Parish School Board,1° where
the court upheld the discharge for cause of a tenured high school
teacher. There was substantial evidence supporting the school
board's findings of several acts of wilful neglect of duty; and, al-
though the court set aside some of the board's findings of fact, five
substantiated charges remained which warranted the court's affirm-
ance of the discharge for cause. The court rejected the teacher's con-
tention that he was entitled to specific notice that his conduct was
wrongful. "[A] classroom teacher merely by the nature of that posi-
tion, should be aware of the impropriety of some practices," including
the acts of neglect of duty proved in the present case, acts "which
need no regulation to define their indecorum.""1 The court also re-
jected the teacher's claim that freedom of speech protected him
against discharge for making remarks in his world history class about
sex activities between black and white races. While the court ac-
knowledged that first amendment rights in the schools are of great
importance," the right of free speech is not absolute, and "there must
be some serious educational purpose underlying the use of a phrase
or word for it to be protected under the auspices of academic free-
dom."63 The court concluded that what the teacher said in class
served no serious educational purpose and was not therefore entitled
to protection. 4
59. 284 So. 2d at 655.
60. 289 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), writ denied, 293 So. 2d 178 (La. 1974).
61. 289 So. 2d at 517, citing Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).
62. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
63. 289 So. 2d at 517. The court here cited its own Celestine opinion, which was
rendered earlier in the term. See Celestine v. Lafayette Parish School Bd., 284 So. 2d
650 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
64. For what it's worth, this writer thinks the court was wrong on its analysis of
the first amendment issue in the case, at least with respect to two of the remarks made
by the teacher in the case. This was a world history class, and the comments made in
the class seem to have some relationship to the historical development of blacks vis-
a-vis whites. There was no showing that what the teacher said ("Integration in
churches and classrooms came recently, but in bed for a long time because if a white
man wanted a little loving he would go across the tracks." "The black man has had
the idea that only white women could love adequately because of picture shows. Until
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It appears from the cases"8 that the court orders to integrate
schools in Louisiana requiring teacher transfers are liable to result in
faculty grievances being filed under Louisiana's Teacher Tenure
Law," which protects a tenured teacher not only against discharge
without cause, but also from transfer to a position of lesser status,
rank, or salary. Two terms ago in Pardue v. Livingston Parish School
Board,7 the First Circuit Court of Appeal held that tenure restric-
tions were violated when a school board assigned a guidance counsel-
lor to the position of English teacher. This term in Dantone v. Tangi-
pahoa Parish School Board, 8 an elementary school was ordered
closed down at the direction of a federal district court, and its faculty
were transferred to another school. On transfer, Dantone was not paid
according to her former status, i.e., principal-teacher, but rather she
was paid only as a classroom teacher. The First Circuit Court of
Appeal applied the rationale of the Pardue case and held that Dan-
tone was entitled to reinstatement of her former salary status of
principal-teacher. The court also ordered the school board to appoint
Dantone to the nearest available position of equal status and rank as
that held by her previously.
One final school case decided this term involves the use of the
judicial process in aid of maintaining peace and quiet on the college
campus. In State Board of Education v. Anthony," the First Circuit
Court of Appeal affirmed issuance of a preliminary injunction against
a number of Southern University students forbidding them from en-
tering on the campus, harassing other students or members of the
faculty, or in any manner disrupting or interfering with the operation
of the University. The record showed (1) that the educational and
administrative functions at Southern University had been brought to
a standstill by the activities of a large number of students; (2) that
those students against whom the preliminary injunction issued were
the leaders of the disruptive students and had participated in the
disruption; and (3) that the students enjoined evinced an intention
recently there were no black women in movies.") caused disruption in class. Moreover,
what was said seems to have some redeeming educational purpose. Clearly, however,
the court was right to sustain Simon's discharge on the other charges made in the case.
65. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 214 So. 2d 203 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1968), noted in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972
Term-Administrative Regulation: Law and Procedure, 30 LA. L. REv, 263, 266 (1969).
66. LA. R.S. 17:443 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 329 §1.
67. 251 So. 2d 833 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), noted in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Administrative Regulation: Law and
Procedure, 33 LA. L. REv. 259, 266-67 (1973).
68. 279 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
69. 289 So. 2d 279 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 35
1975] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1973-1974 363
to continue those activities if they were permitted to return to the
campus. There was evidence of occupations of administrative build-
ings and offices, wholesale boycott of classes, sizable demonstra-
tions, interruptions of classes, burning and disruption of university
property, and similar activities. The court concluded that the situa-
tion clearly called for issuance of a preliminary injunction to preserve
the status quo of the educational process at Southern University;
otherwise irreparable injury in the legal sense would have been suf-
fered by the University and by those students who wanted to continue
their education.
STATE RACING COMMISSION
Jefferson Downs, Inc. v. Louisiana State Racing Commissions is
the only case this term which expressly considers the impact of Louis-
iana's Administrative Procedure Act7 on the adequacy of agency pro-
cess in this state. And from the viewpoint of good administrative
regulation, it's nice to see counsel and the court citing and applying
our Administrative Procedure Act. The case is important for what it
says about how administrative agencies covered by the act must con-
duct agency adjudications," such as those involved in granting or
denying racing permits. But there is also a threshold substantive
point in the case: the State Racing Commission, the court held, has
the authority by statute to grant a racing permit for a fewer number
of days than the number requested by an applicant if the dates in the
permit are within the time period requested. The Fourth Circuit re-
fused to read the statutory authority to grant or to refuse a permit 3
as denying to the Commission the authority to grant the permit, but
for a fewer number of days.
Regarding the integrity of the administrative process, the
Jefferson Downs case makes two points. First, Louisiana's adminis-
trative law now reflects what is known as the Ashbacker doctrine,
after Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion.74 In that case the United States Supreme Court held that,
where two bona fide applications to an administrative agency are
mutually exclusive, the grant of one without a hearing to both de-
prives the loser of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The legal
70. 288 So. 2d 653 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
71. LA. R.S. 49:951-66 (Supp. 1967).
72. Under the act "'adjudication' means agency process for the formulation of a
decision or order." LA. R.S. 49:951(1) (Supp. 1967).
73. LA. R.S. 4:158 (Supp. 1968).
74. 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
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posture in the Jefferson Downs case was the same-that is, multiple
applicants sought the grant of mutually exclusive, or at least overlap-
ping, privileges. Both Jefferson Downs and Evangeline Downs wanted
almost identical racing dates, but, according to the State Racing
Commission, these two tracks were in competition with each other,
and to grant both permits in full would have undermined the quality
of thoroughbred racing in the area of Louisiana involved. Yet the
Racing Commission granted Evangeline Downs' application for the
full schedule of racing dates requested by it, without at the same time
considering Jefferson Downs' application. Jefferson Downs objected
to the Commission's practice of alphabetically taking up, consider-
ing, and disposing of each application before passing on the next one.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal agreed that this agency proce-
dure was arbitrary and "abrasive to any concept of objectivity"75
because, under this procedure, the applicants who are alphabetically
heard first are at an advantage in requesting and obtaining dates over
those who are heard later. A reasonable approach, said the court,
requires the Commission, when aware in advance that conflicting
dates are requested, to afford both applicants an equal opportunity
to present the merits of their requests and to have a determination
made on the requests after they are considered together. Since this
was not done, the court had jurisidiction5 to reverse the decision of
the Racing Commission and to remand the case to the Commission
for an expeditious hearing on Jefferson Downs' request for racing
dates in accordance with the state Administrative Procedure Act.
There was one other failure of administrative process in the
Jefferson Downs case:
It is apparent that the defendant employed a laxed and unexact-
ing procedure devoid of staff reports and studies or sworn testi-
mony, and no opportunity was afforded to interested parties for
confrontation and cross examination. This practice is not at all
consistent with the letter or the spirit of the administrative proce-
dure act."
What the court condemned was the Commission's reliance on its own
alleged expertise to reach the conclusion that there was not enough
racing support for both Evangeline Downs and Jefferson Downs to
operate as fully as each track had requested. No record evidence
75. 288 So. 2d at 656.
76. Pursuant to LA. R.S. 49:964(G)(5) (Supp. 1966), which authorizes the review-
ing court to reverse agency action when it is "arbitrary or capricious or characterized
by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
77. 288 So. 2d at 656.
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existed on this crucial determination, and without an evidentiary
foundation in the record to this effect, the court was compelled to
hold the agency's determination unlawful and subject to reversal. It
made no difference that under R.S. 49:956(3) an agency may take
notice "of generally recognized technical or scientific facts within the
agency's specialized knowledge." The record must reflect what spe-
cialized facts the agency considered, and the affected party must be
given notice of and an opportunity to contest whatever specialized
facts an agency uses in making its adjudicative determination. All
the record revealed in Jefferson Downs was the "predisposed observa-
tions" of Commission members, and this, too, was not in compliance
with the state Administrative Procedure Act.
By its decision in Jefferson Downs, the Fourth Circuit has se-
cured to the judiciary the capacity to effectively review administra-
tive action in this state, and the case is a sound development in our
administrative regulation; judicial review of administrative action
would only be a nice slogan if an administrative agency were allowed
to justify a decision on the basis of unknown and unknowable exper-
tise-expertise which is usually always hidden from the fresh air of
record review. The Fourth Circuit's opinion reminds one of Louis
Jaffe's point that
[t]he 'law' does not operate in a vacuum. The application of law
requires a factual predicate; an action without such a predicate
is lawless. A finding of fact which is based on no more than the
will or desire of the administrator is lawless in substance if not
in form."8
And, like the holding in Jefferson Downs, Professor Jaffe would insist
that "expertness is not a magic wand which can be indiscriminately
waved over the corpus of an agency's findings to preserve them from
review.""9 It should be easier now, after the Jefferson Downs case, for
students of administrative regulation to understand why our Admin-
istrative Procedure Act requires agencies relying on facts within their
own specialized knowledge to spread those facts on the record and to
make them available to the parties:" this requirement enables af-
fected parties to challenge agency factual determinations and it facil-
itates judicial review of administrative action in this state. The idea
of R.S. 49:956(3) is that an agency's experience, technical compe-
tence, and specialized knowledge "may be utilized in the evaluation
78. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 595 (1965).
79. Id. at 613.
80. See LA. R.S. 32:661-69 (Supp. 1968).
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of the evidence," but not in substitution of the necessary factual
predicate for lawful administrative action.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Louisiana's Alcoholic Beverage Control Law requires as a condi-
tion for obtaining an alcoholic beverage permit that the applicant
"has not been convicted of a felony under the laws of the United
States, the State of Louisiana, or any other state or country."'" In
Sportservice Corp. v. Department of Public Safety,"2 the question was
whether the Commissioner on Alcoholic Beverage Control was right
to revoke a permit where the holder had been convicted of a felony
in a United States district court, but where the conviction had not
yet become final, because an appeal was pending at the time of the
revocation and at the time of judicial review of the Commissioner's
order. The Fourth Circuit, citing language from State v. Gani,83 de-
cided that the expression "convicted of a felony" used in R.S. 26:279
A(5) requires a conviction that is final through all appellate stages
as well as final with respect to the trial stage.
To the writer, the court's decision in the Sportservice case seems
wrong for several reasons. First, the court itself recognizes that an-
other provision of the Alcholoic Beverage Control Law allows the
Commissioner to revoke a permit for simple "violation" (not "convic-
tion") of a schedule of prohibited acts, with or without criminal pro-
ceedings;" moreover, R.S. 26:286(3) authorizes revocation for certain
acts where the permittee "has been found guilty" by a trial court.
Certainly these two provisions together suggest that conviction at
trial is enough to disqualify an applicant from obtaining a permit,
and if this conclusion is sound then it would seem to follow from R.S.
26:279(C)I5 that the Commissioner was well within his authority when
he revoked the permits of the Sportservice Corporation. Finally, R.S.
26:93, which is in pari materia, also indicates that a conviction is
unnecessary to withhold, suspend, or revoke alcoholic beverage per-
81. LA. R.S. 26:279(A)(5) (1950).
82. 293 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
83. 157 La. 231, 102 So. 318 (1924). The language cited from the Gani case is not
really apposite to the issue of finality through the appellate stage. Gani discusses
finality at the trial stage, and not beyond.
84. See LA. R.S. 26:285 (1950), as amended.
85. "If the applicant, or any other person required to have the same qualifications,
does not possess the required qualifications, the permit may be denied, suspended, or
revoked." This section would seem to contemplate disqualification after issuance of
an initial permit. In other words, a permittee must maintain his qualifications
throughout the period of licensure.
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mits. With all deference, the Fourth Circuit's contrary conclusion in
what is essentially a revocation case is too restrictive a view; to re-
quire finality through all appellate stages leaves convicted felons free,
for at least a while, to deal in alcoholic beverages in Louisiana, a
result hardly consistent with the letter and spirit of the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Law. At least the Commissioner should have the
authority to suspend a permit pending an appeal, but the logic of the
court's opinion would seem to preclude this sensible approach also.
DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
Evans v. State Department of Employment Security'6 reiterates
two important principles of Louisiana unemployment compensation
law: (1) under R.S. 23:1601(2) and the established jurisprudence an
employer has the burden of proving that a claimant's discharge was
for misconduct connected with his or her employment, otherwise the
claimant is entitled to compensation; and (2) sufficient legal and
competent evidence must support the findings of the board of review
as to the facts. In the Evans case no representative of the employer
testified before the appeals referee; only Evans' termination notice,
which stated he was terminated for reporting to work while intoxi-
cated, tended to show that Evans was discharged for misconduct
connected with his employment. But this notice, the court held, was
hearsay and not legally competent as evidence. Thus nothing re-
mained in the record except Evans' own testimony to the effect that
he was not drunk on the job. Moreover, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeal cited its own earlier decision in Heard v. Doya 7 for the propo-
sition that mere disbelief of a claimant's testimony does not supply
the proof of employee misconduct required of the employer. The court
held that, on the record presented, the Division of Employment Secu-
rity had erred in denying claimant Evans unemployment compensa-
tion.
Just what constitutes disqualifying misconduct within the mean-
ing of R.S. 23:1601(2) has been repeatedly defined in the jurisprud-
ence.88 But little thought has been given in the cases to the narrower
86. 292 So. 2d 265 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
87. 259 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972), noted in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term -Administrative Regulation: Law and
Procedure, 33 LA. L. REv. 259, 267-68 (1973).
88. Horns v. Brown 243 La. 936, 942, 148 So. 2d 607, 609 (1963): "Misconduct
within the meaning of an unemployment compensation act excluding from its benefits
an employee discharged for misconduct must be an act of wanton or wilful disregard
of the employer's interest, a deliberate violation of the employer's rules, a disregard of
standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or
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problem of whether the issue of disqualifying misconduct is a ques-
tion of fact for primary determination by the administrator of Louis-
iana's Unemployment Compensation Act, in which case the adminis-
trative determination if supported by sufficient evidence would be
conclusive,81 or a question of law for the courts, in which case the
judges themselves would independently determine whether an em-
ployee was discharged for misconduct connected with employment. 0
Or indeed there is a third possibility: it is possible to view an issue
of disqualifying misconduct as a mixed question of law and fact, with
primary responsibility for decision on the question resting sometimes
with the administrator of the act and sometimes with the court,
depending on the extent to which agency expertise is helpful in re-
solving the issue in a particular case. Three cases decided this term
in the courts of appeal suggest that our courts are treating the issue
of disqualifying misconduct actually as a mixed question of law and
fact.
For instance, sometimes the court defers to the administrative
determination that no disqualifying misconduct is involved in a par-
ticular case, and the court seems to treat the issue of disqualifying
misconduct as one of fact for primary determination by the appeals
referee and the board of review. Piggly Wiggly Operators' Warehouse
Inc. v. Doyal is such a case. In this case the claimant and his em-
ployer exchanged loud and abusive language during a discussion of
work schedules. The appeals referee found as facts that claimant was
only asserting his rights during the discussion; that both parties were
guilty of using abusive language; and that the employer unjustly
,reprimanded the claimant. On these facts the agency decided that no
.disqualifying misconduct had been shown in the case by the em-
ployer. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, saying that it
negligence in such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or
evil design, or show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interest
or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer."
89. See LA. R.S. 23:1634 (1950): "[T]he findings of the board of review as to the
facts, if supported by sufficient evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclu-
sive."
90. See LA. R.S. 23:1634 (1950): "[The jurisdiction of the court shall be confined
to questions of law."
Professor Davis in his treatise points out that there is a lack of judicial consistency
regarding treatment of a particular issue as one of fact or one of law, and he says that
"even the most discerning and most conscientious judges are commonly limited in
their articulation of what they do by a combined inability and unwillingness to spell
out the detailed facts about the intensity of their review and about the influences upon
their behavior with respect to review." K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 30.08,
at 233 (1958).
91. 297 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
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was required to accept the administrative findings of fact in this case
since they were supported by sufficient evidence; however, the opin-
ion of the court in Piggly Wiggly goes on to read as though the court
is treating the ultimate determination of no misconduct as a question
of fact too, or at least the reader senses a healthy judicial respect for
the agency's ultimate administrative determination in the case.
The judicial deference in cases like Piggly Wiggly, where the
agency decides that the claimant is not disqualified for unemploy-
ment compensation benefits, is supported by the remedial nature of
the Employment Security Act-that is, the benefits of the act should
be extended as far as possible and the term "misconduct" should be
construed in a manner least favorable to working a forfeiture of bene-
fits in any particular case. 2 Moreover, in the writer's view, when the
issue is misconduct vel non, a court would be wise to defer to the
judgment of the administrative agency charged with the front-line
responsibility of administering Louisiana's unemployment compen-
sation system. One would not expect the Division of Employment
Security to disqualify a claimant for job-related misconduct except
in clear cases, and what the writer would suggest as an appropriate
scope of review in these cases is that the court should affirm the
agency's ultimate conclusion of misconduct vel non so long as the
agency's determination passes a threshold test of reasonableness. In
each case the court should ask itself not what it thinks or feels about
the claimant's alleged misconduct, but whether the agency's conclu-
sion is a reasonable one. And the agency's conclusion need not be the
only reasonable conclusion either; it is enough that the administra-
tive determination is a reasonable view of the claimant's conduct in
any particular case. A reviewing court should also recognize that in
some cases the agency, because of its specialized knowledge of in-
dustrial practices, is in a better position to determine whether dis-
qualifying misconduct is involved in a specific case.
What all this means, of course, is that the writer would not be
averse to allowing the Division of Employment Security, working
through its appeals referee and its board of review, to fashion the law
on employee misconduct in Louisiana unemployment compensation
cases, subject only to limited judicial review for reasonableness. This
would not contravene the provision of the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Act that establishes jurisdiction in our courts to review questions
of law which are involved in compensation cases, 3 for it would be a
mistake to think that, because a court has jurisdiction to review
92. See Sewell v. Sharp, 102 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
93. LA. R.S. 23:1634 (1950).
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questions of law in administrative cases, a court must decide every
question of law for itself. Rather, the court should allow some discre-
tion to the administrative agency in the first instance to fashion the
law as it sees fit because, as Professor Jaffe has pointed out, "the
administrative and the judiciary share the role of law pronouncing
and law making. They are in partnership."" True, Professor Jaffe
agrees that the court is the senior partner; it may supersede the
administrative agency and determine a question of law for itself.
Nevertheless, he still insists that the responsibility for deciding ques-
tions of law should be shared between court and administrative
agency. Otherwise the root idea of the administrative process, the
idea that effectuation of some social purposes is better left to admin-
istrative agencies than to courts, would be undermined.
Applying all these ideas, one would expect reviewing courts in
the main to affirm decisions of the Division of Employment Security,
and the Second Circuit's opinion this term in Piggly Wiggly is typical
in this regard. However, another opinion of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeal this term in Phills v. Doyal" seems inconsistent with the
review thesis presented here. In this case the court summarily re-
versed the decision of the appeals referee and the board of review that
claimant was disqualified for benefits because of misconduct con-
nected with her employment, yet the agency's conclusion hardly
seems unreasonable on the facts. The employer's superintendent tes-
tified that Phills was discharged because she used abusive language
while they were discussing a malfunctioning time clock. Unlike the
situation in Piggly Wiggly, nothing in the facts suggested that both
parties were guilty of using bad language. The appeals referee found
that the claimant told the plant superintendent "what he could do
with the buzzer in an unlady like manner and then she was dis-
charged." Clearly, this conduct would seem to fit the definition of
disqualifying misconduct quoted by the court of appeal on review as
''a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right
to expect of his employee . . . ."" Why reverse then? Because the
employer has the burden of proving misconduct? This seems an un-
tenable reason for setting aside the agency's disqualification in Phills
v. Doyal, because the superintendent's testimony satisfies the em-
ployer's legal burden of proof. Yet no other legal principle is cited or
discussed by the Second Circuit in the Phills case for the court's
abrupt conclusion that the agency erred in denying compensation. If
94. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546 (1965).
95. 291 So. 2d 444 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
96. Id. at 446.
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the court has in mind a law rule that a single, hotheaded incident
cannot disqualify a claimant under the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Act, 7 especially where the claimant has worked for a substantial
period of time without other incident, then it would be best for the
court to say so directly. But as it now reads, the court's opinion in
Phills v. Doyal is deficient: the court fails to tell the agency what it
did wrong in the case, and there is little for the agency to go on in
the future to correct its ways; the opinion looks too ad hoc for this
writer because, although the court acknowledges the rule of limited
judicial review, in the very next breath the court seems to disregard
the limitation and to substitute its own conclusion for that of the
agency without adequate explanation. Surely this makes for war be-
tween court and administrative agency, when what is needed most
between them is not war, but the idea of partnership-to use Profes-
sor Jaffe's illuminating expression." And what is needed toward that
end, and this is essential, is a principled scheme of limited judicial
review, not review ad hoc.
Southern Pacific Transport Co. v. Doyal" is another case this
term in which the judiciary asserts itself as senior partner (vis-A-vis
the Division of Employment Security) with respect to questions of
unemployment compensation law in Louisiana. But this time the
scope of judicial review in the case is principled: the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal has a rule of law in mind that the agency did not
follow; the court explains itself to the agency, telling the agency why
it went wrong and what it should do in similar cases in the future;
moreover, and most important, the reversal seems plainly justified
because the agency, in resolving the issue of misconduct in the case,
disregarded the standards of impermissible employee conduct set
forth in the collective bargaining agreement between the claimant
and his employer. This is principled judicial review, not review ad
hoc, because the court has not set itself free to reverse at will; it is
only saying to the agency that it should respect the contract between
the parties in determining whether a particular employee was dis-
charged for misconduct connected with his or her employment. This
is a law rule which the agency should have seen for itself and one
which the agency can probably live with in future cases.
On its facts the Southern Pacific Transport Co. case involves a
truck driver who was discharged for violating the company's policy
regarding employee personal appearance, particularly employee hair
97. Accord, Williams v. Brown, 157 So. 2d 237 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
98. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
99. 289 So. 2d 882 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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length. The company had the right, under the collective bargaining
agreement between it and truck drivers, to fix and to maintain rea-
sonable standards for wearing apparel and personal grooming. The
appeals referee concluded that no legal misconduct was involved in
the case and that the case involved only a controversy as to whose
set of values regarding hair styles would prevail. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal reversed:
The question here is not simply a matter of whose set of values
regarding hair styles would prevail. By a contract between the
employer and the bargaining agent of the employees, the em-
ployer was granted the right to determine which hair style would
prevail. . . .As we view the issue here it is a case of an employee
who chooses to attempt to impose his standards upon his em-
ployer, despite his agreement to the contrary through his
Union.100
Quoting from a federal case,"'1 the court went on to point out that the
company's interest in the neat grooming of its truck drivers made
good business sense, taking judicial notice of the fact that, in public
service, industries, employers are indeed concerned about the image
their employees create in the public's mind; and the court's conclu-
sion followed that claimant's wilful disregard of the employer's rea-
sonable grooming regulations constituted disqualifying employee
misconduct under the Employment Security Act.
ZONING BOARDS
Regarding judicial control of administrative action, Professor
Jaffe has said (and this applies to all agencies, and not just zoning
boards): "The availability of judicial review is the necessary condi-
tion, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative
power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid."'' 2 Our su-
preme court said the same thing three years ago in Bowen v. Doyal,'0 3
in which the court held that, although administrative bodies have the
authority to determine as original propositions the matters delegated
to them by statute, a person whose legal rights are adversely affected
by the administrative determination may test its legal correctness in
100. Id. at 884.
101. Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
102. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965).
103. 259 La. 839, 253 So. 2d 200 (1971), noted in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Administrative Regulation: Law and
Procedure, 33 LA. L. REv. 259, 267 (1973).
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the courts. The court spoke of a broad presumption that all adminis-
trative determinations are subject to judicial review, although on its
facts Bowen involved only one agency, the Division of Employment
Security. Surely Bowen v. Doyal will prove itself a landmark in
Louisiana administrative regulation, and, as a matter of fact, it bore
fruit this term in several zoning board cases. In one particularly nota-
ble case, Magnum Corp. v. Dauphin,104 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeal, applying the idea that all administrative action is subject to
judicial review," 5 held that district courts in Louisiana have original
jurisdiction to review the determinations of boards of zoning adjust-
ment and that an absolute right of review exists, despite the fact that
R.S. 33:4727 authorizes only a discretionary review in the district
court by means of certiorari.
Bowen v. Doyal and its progeny (and there will be more after
Magnum) preserve the proud tradition of judges watching over the
shoulders of our administrative agencies; they guarantee that, in
Louisiana, the administrative arena will be governed by the Rule of
Law. And to take a final, overall look at the cases-they show that
our courts have well kept their administrative trust during the 1973-
1974 term. 00
104. 293 So. 2d 582 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), writ denied, 295 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974).
105. The Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion during the term with regard
to zoning boards, saying: "Certainly the Zoning Board is an Administrative Agency."
River Oaks-Hyman Place Home-owners Civic Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 281 So.
2d 293, 294 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
106. The usual concomitant of judicial review of administrative action, an insis-
tence by the court on adequate standards cabining agency discretion, also appeared
in the cases this term. See Summerell v. Phillips, 282 So. 2d 450 (La. 1973) (zoning
ordinance containing no standards for uniform exercise of power to issue or to deny
permits is unconstitutional); Jefferson Downs, Inc. v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n,
288 So. 2d 653, 657-59 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (Morial, J., concurring).
